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Improving Reverse Supply Chain Performance:   
The Role of Supply Chain Leadership and Governance Mechanisms 
Ahmad Rais Mohamad Mokhtar1, Andrea Genovese1, Andrew Brint1, Niraj Kumar2 
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2Liverpool University Management School, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK 
Recently, a growing interest has been devoted to the role of buying firms in promoting 
sustainability across supply chains. However, relatively little attention has been given to how 
the behaviour of a buying firm affects the performance of reverse supply chains. Within this 
context, this paper investigates the role of Supply Chain Leadership stylHV RQ VXSSOLHUV¶
performance dimensions related to reverse product flows. Furthermore, the mediating role of 
two governance mechanisms (namely trust and legal-legitimate power) on this relationship is 
examined. This study employs structural equation modelling to analyse data collected from 
190 manufacturing companies in Malaysia.  The paper concludes that transformational and 
transactional leaderships are significant and positive contributors to VXSSOLHUV¶UHYHUVHsupply 
chain performance; trust and power significantly mediate these relationships. 
Keywords ± Supply Chain Leadership, Governance Mechanisms, 6XSSOLHUV¶ 3HUIRUPDQFH
Buyer-Supplier Relationship, Reverse Supply Chains 
1. Introduction 
The Circular Economy (CE) paradigm pushes the frontiers of environmental, economic and 
social sustainability by emphasising the idea of transforming products in such a way that there 
are workable relationships between ecological systems and economic activities (Kirchherr et 
al., 2017).  This is achieved by creating a paradigm shift in the design of material flows, based 
on the notion of waste and by-products as a resource in manufacturing processes (Genovese et 
al., 2017).  CE has been increasingly integrated into supply chain research and practice through 
concepts such as circular business models and circular product design (Geissdoerfer et al., 
2017; Murray et al., 2017).   
The main notion of CE is not only to improve environmental sustainability by enhancing 
traditional performance measures, but also by taking care of reverse supply chain performance 
(RSCP) by improving the management of end-of-life products and intermediate by-products 
through reusing, recycling and refurbishment options (Nasir et al., 2016). As such, reverse 
supply chains (RSCs) are at the backbone of operationalising CE concepts at a meso-level, 
enacting inter-firm collaboration (Genovese et al., 2017). The management of RSCs carries a 
number of economic, social and environmental issues and implications, which are further 
exacerbated by the involvement of multiple actors in RSC operations (Genovese et al., 2017).  
In order to ensure a successful implementation of RSCs, all stakeholders in the supply chains, 
including buying firms, should take responsibility in optimising the adoption of RSC practices 
(Defee et al., 2009; Kannan, 2018; Mathivathanan et al., 2018).   
Within this context, buying firms should be able to orchestrate production processes across 
supply chains by playing a leadership role towards upstream suppliers (Defee et al., 2009). 
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Supply chain leadership (SCL) is concerned with the ability of an organisation (for example, 
WKHEX\LQJILUPLQDVXSSO\FKDLQWRLQIOXHQFHIROORZHUV¶IRUH[DPSOHVXSSOLHUVDFWLRQVRU
behaviours (Defee et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2017).   
Recently, studies about the influence of SCL on the implementation of sustainable practices 
within supply chains have been observed (Vivaldini and Pires, 2016; Agi and Nishant, 2017; 
Blome et al., 2017; Gabler et al., 2017; Gosling et al., 2017; Gunasekaran et al., 2017).  
However, within this emerging body of knowledge, most of the empirical studies are centred 
on the improvement of more traditional linear performance measures (such as the ones related 
to green procurement and manufacturing) (Silvestre, 2015; Wilhelm et al., 2016; Kurucz et al., 
2017; Roman, 2017).  Very little emphasis has been devoted to RSCs even though the CE 
paradigm has been extensively promoted in the supply chain environment.  
Furthermore, even though prior studies proposed that SCL and governance mechanisms have 
a potential in simultaneously contributing towards sustainability practices in supply chains 
(Gong et al., 2018; Jia et al., 2018), current literature fails to examine those concepts together, 
resulting in unclear explanations of the role of leadership styles and governance mechanisms 
in managing supply chain relationships and performance.   
This study aims at addressing these gaps by providing an empirical investigation into the 
relationship between SCL and RSCP while also considering the mediating role of governance 
mechanisms.  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review 
discussing RSCP and the role of leadership, trust and power in a supply chain context, with 
specific emphasis on the influence of SCL on RSCP.  This section also provides theoretical 
arguments and proposes the associated hypotheses.  Employed research methods are presented 
in Section 3. Findings are illustrated in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper with a discussion on potential opportunities for future research. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Reverse Supply Chains: Generalities and Performance Measurement 
'XH WR SUHVVXUHV IURP VWDNHKROGHUV ILUPV¶ IRFXV RQ HFRQRPLF SHUIRUPDQFH QHHGV WR EH
accompanied by care for environmental and social performance (Chan and Kumar, 2007; 
Seuring and Müller, 2008; Genovese et al., 2013). At the same time, alternative economic 
models are shaping the development of new forms of supply chains; this is the case of the CE 
paradigm, which is embracing the notion of restorative industrial systems (Genovese et al.,  
2017).    
Reverse supply chains (RSCs) can be seen as one of the most prominent ways of implementing 
CE practices at an inter-organisational level.  In general, a RSC designs a set of activities to 
recover end-of-life and after-use products and intermediate by-products by the original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), suppliers or any third parties.  These activities can be 
associated with an open-loop process, where the materials or products are retrieved and reused 
by parties other than the original manufacturers, or a closed-loop process, where retrieved 
products are returned back to the original manufacturers for recycling, reuse or refurbishment 
(Genovese et al., 2017). Transforming traditional linear supply chains into RSCs aims at 
ensuring that waste can be minimised, while protecting reducing the excessive usage of virgin 
materials (Prahinski and Kocabasoglu, 2006; Shaharudin et al., 2017; Kannan, 2018).   
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Several performance measures have been developed in order to keep track of RSC 
performance; these can be classified into cost, quality, time and flexibility categories (see Table 
1). Previous studies inferred that in order to ensure that environmental performance is 
maximised across supply chains, sXSSOLHUV¶ adherence to sustainable standards must be 
monitored as well (Sarkis, 2003; Genovese et al., 2014).  
Table 1:  Initial Items Proposed to Measure RSCP 
Construct Items Sources 
Cost i. Cost of processing recyclable products 
ii. Cost of retrieving returned products 
iii. Cost of storing returned products 
iv. Cost of remanufacturing, replenishment and reproduction of returned 
products 
Hazen et al. 
(2015; 
Olugu and 
Wong 
(2012) 
Quality i. Availability of recyclable / reusable materials in products 
ii. Availability of material recovery plan and warranty returns 
iii. Ability to remanufacture and refurbish returned products 
Time i. Lead-time for unsold products to be remanufactured / refurbished 
ii. Lead-time for warranty returns products to be 
remanufactured/refurbished 
iii. Lead-time product recycling and reuse 
Flexibility i. Ability to incorporate traditional practices with reverse supply chain 
practices (i.e: dismantling parts and recycle) 
ii. Ability to provide new infrastructure for new products research and 
development 
iii. Ability to produce products with high reusable and recyclable materials 
However, the implementation of RSCs carries a number of implications for risk management. 
This includes, for example, the availability of stable and predictable streams of products to be 
recovered, where the environmental benefit depends on reducing the risk of the non-availability 
of related resources (Soleimani et al., 2014). Furthermore, the relationships among different 
stakeholders at multiple tiers of RSCs are often less stable and more challenging to establish 
than in forward supply chains, as product returns are dependent on their life-cycle and on the 
marginal value-of-time (Guide et al., 2003; Vivaldini and Pires, 2016). As such, close alliances 
and coordination are needed throughout supply chain activities in order to fully realise the 
potential of RSCs; in this context, buying firms can play a prominent role as orchestrators of 
these activities, through leadership approaches and governance mechanisms (Vivaldini and 
Pires, 2016; Blome et al., 2017; Roman, 2017). 
2.2 The Role of Leadership in a Supply Chain Context 
For centuries, leadership has represented a prolific research stream in the fields of management 
and organisational behaviour.  Recently, research on leadership has been extended to the inter-
organisational setting (Müller-Seitz and Sydow, 2012); notably, the concept of supply chain 
leadership (SCL) has been emerging. The development of this domain can be seen from the 
initial discussions on channel leadership (based on manufacturer-retailer relationships), supply 
chain governance (including elements of both relational and contractual governance), 
institutional pressure (based on isomorphism concepts). Defee et al. (2010, pp. 766) provided 
the first definition of SCL in the literature as:   
«³a relational concept involving the supply chain leader and one or more supply chain 
follower organisations that interact in a dynamic, co-influencing process.  The supply 
chain leader is characterised as the organisation that demonstrates higher levels of the 
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four elements of leadership in relation to other member organisations (i.e. the 
organisation capable of greater influence, readily identifiable by its behaviours, 
creator of the vision, and that establishes a relationship with other supply chain 
organisations)´ 
In the same vein, Lockstrom et al. (2010,  pp. 251) defined SCL as the ability of the buying 
firm 
« ³to influence a supplier to achieve a common goDO ZLWKLQ WKH VXSSOLHU¶V
organisation´ 
Lockstrom et al. (2010) further explained that the leadership style of a buying firm has the 
ability to improve a ILUP¶VUHODWLRQDOFDSLWDOLQFOXGLQJVXSSOLHUV¶FRPPLWPHQWDQGVXSSO\FKDLQ
relationships.  Drawing upon these two definitions, this study considers SCL as the behaviours 
of the buying firms in influencing the actions of their upstream suppliers.   
Defee et al. (2010) deduced that SCL is an antecedent of improved supply chain performance 
by placing emphasis on the ability of buying firms to articulate a vision for the future, 
communicate the vision and motivate supply chain members. SCL has been identified as the 
antecedent of improved supply chain performance including relationship commitment (Hult et 
al., 2000a), organisational learning (Hult et al., 2000b),  supply chain efficiency (Defee et al., 
2010), supply chain learning (Gosling et al., 2017),  and supply chain agility (Dubey et al., 
2018).  Also, contemporary literature suggests that strong commitment and leadership are 
required in order to improve the competitiveness of supply chains (Gosling et al., 2017; Gong 
et al., 2018); in other words, buying firms should move from organisation-centric towards inter-
organisational network management to address and cultivate supply chain members needs and 
requirements. 
Contemporary research also highlights the role of SCL towards supply chain sustainability 
performance. Meinlschmidt et al. (2018) stated that SCL is crucial in ensuring that upstream 
suppliers adopt green manufacturing practices.  The ability of a buying firm to develop lower 
tier suppliers and encourage them towards environmental sustainability practices is determined 
by their own leadership behaviours.  The role of SCL is not only limited to dyadic supply chain 
relationship (for example, the relationship between a buying firm and a tier-1 supplier), but 
also significant in multi-tier or myriad-based supply chain relationships (Jia et al., 2018; 
Meinlschmidt et al., 2018)  7KLV LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKH LQIOXHQFH RI EX\LQJ ILUPV¶ OHDGHUVKLS
behaviours can penetrate beyond tier-1 suppliers. Leadership styles chosen by buying firms can 
differ significantly from time to time and from one supplier to another based on contextual and 
socio-economic factors. Leadership styles of the buying firms are also influenced by the extent 
of supplLHUV¶GHSHQGHQF\RQWKHP,QRUGHUIRUDEX\LQJILUPWRFDWHUfor the specific needs of 
different suppliers and orchestrate the whole supply chain sustainability activities efficiently, 
they should rely on a multi-faceted and adaptive leadership style (Agi and Nishant, 2017; 
Gosling et al., 2017).  A visible leadership portrayed by the buying firm can assist multiple 
stakeholders to implement environmental sustainability plans (Gabler et al., 2017).  In other 
words, a buying firm is responsible to enforce sustainability initiatives and exhibit necessary 
leadership behaviours (such as motivation, control, audit and reward) in order to ensure that 
the suppliers adhere to its sustainability plan (Kurucz et al., 2017; Dubey et al., 2015).  To date, 
similar dynamics have also been observed in relation to the implementation of sustainability 
initiatives by third-party logistics providers, highlighting the need for focal firm leadership and 
coordination (Centobelli et al., 2017).   
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Usually, in the SCM context, a distinction is made between transformational and transactional 
leadership styles. The following sub-sections provide more information about these two 
leadership styles. 
2.2.1 Transformational Leadership in Supply Chain Context  
Transformational leadership is characterised by four main dimensions, which are idealised 
influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration 
(Table 2). When adopting a transformational style, a leader is acting as a role model to the 
followers, motivating followers towards better performance and generating awareness 
regarding visions and missions of the group ( Bass and Avolio, 1990; Yammarino et al., 1993; 
Judge and Piccolo, 2004; Bass and Bass, 2008). Drawing upon this concept, transformational 
leadership in the SCM context refers to the ability of a buying firm to motivate and stimulate 
their supply chain PHPEHUV¶ DFWLRQV DQG behaviours.  By exhibiting transformational 
leadership, supply chain leaders can enhance communication and information sharing, which 
is essential for supply chain collaboration (Birasnav, 2013).  Moreover, Hult et al. (2000b) 
highlighted that a buying firm practising transformational leadership can enhance its 
organisational learning.  Overstreet et al. (2013) claimed that there is a positive relationship 
between transformational leadership approaches exhibited by the buying firm and their 
operational performance.  Transformational leadership of the buying firm can expand 
organisational innovativeness and lead to a higher financial performance of the organisation.  
Moreover,  transformational leadership by the buying firm can enable itself to manage 
organisational change, articulate vision, DQG GHYHORS VXSSOLHUV¶ FRPPLWPHQW (Defee et al., 
2010; Overstreet et al., 2013).   
Table 2:  The Dimensions of Transformational SCL 
Dimension Description Sources 
Idealised 
Influence 
A buying firm acts and behaves in ways that their followers will see 
them as a role model.  A buying firm is required to lead by example, 
which results in their being admired, respected and trusted by their 
supply chain followers such as their upstream suppliers.  
Hult et al., 
(2000a); Hult et 
al., (2007); 
Birasnav et al., 
(2015). 
Inspirational 
Motivation 
Buying firms should be able to motivate and inspire their supply chain 
members by providing meaning and suggestion.  By demonstrating 
PRWLYDWLRQDO DQG LQVSLUDWLRQDO FRQFHSWV LQ WKH OHDGHU¶V PDQDJHPHQW
style, a buying firm will be able to generate team spirit, enthusiasm and 
optimism among their suppliers. 
Intellectual 
Stimulation 
%X\LQJ ILUPV VKRXOG EH DEOH WR VWLPXODWH IROORZHUV¶ LQWHOOHFWXDO
capacity to be more innovative and creative.  There are a few ways of 
VWLPXODWLQJ VXSSO\ FKDLQ PHPEHUV¶ VXFK DV XSVWUHDP VXSSOLHUV
intellectual capacity including questioning assumptions, reframing and 
redefining problems or issues, and providing new ways of approaching 
old practices. 
Individualised 
Consideration 
%X\LQJILUPVDOVRIRFXVRQIROORZHUV¶LQGLYLGXDOQHHGVSDUWLFXODUO\IRU
DFKLHYHPHQWDQGJURZWK)ROORZHUV¶LQGLYLGXDOQHHGVFDQEHDFKLHYHG
in several ways including the leader acting as a coach or mentor.  
Individualised consideration is important in promoting new learning 
opportunities for the suppliers. 
Vivaldini and Pires (2016) found that closed-loop practices in the fast-food retail industry could 
only be implemented in presence of a collaborative relationship between buying firms and their 
logistics service providers (LSPs).  The planning and implementation phases of recycling 
should involve both parties in order to ensure that waste collection and transfer activities are 
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more coordinated, and at the same time improve the LSPs sense of responsibility.  Moreover, 
the success of closed-loop supply chain practices is based on the ability of the buying firm to 
coordinate upstream and downstream supply chain members including suppliers, retailers and 
distributors (Szekely and Strebel, 2013).  Given the dynamic nature of the supply chain 
environment, a buying firm should be able to engage with supply chain members in all tiers 
and orientations (upstream or downstream) to ensure that the needs of RSC practices are well 
addressed.  A buying firm should establish shared goals with supply chain members, so that 
the implementation of RSC practices will benefit all of them.  A buying firm should  inspire 
supply chain members to work collaboratively to ensure the new supply chain orientation 
towards a RSC can be implemented (Defee et al., 2009).  The ability to coach and mentor the 
suppliers towards RSC practicHVIRVWHUVXSSOLHUV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRZRUNFROODERUDWLYHO\ZLWKWKH
buying firms in realising the EX\LQJ ILUPV¶ 56&V initiatives (Vachon and Klassen, 2006).  
Furthermore, acting as the role model, coach or mentor, buying firms will allow suppliers to 
learn about RSC practices which are currently being implemented (Kocabasoglu et al., 2007; 
Dubey et al., 2018)7KXVWKLVZLOOGLUHFWO\LQIOXHQFHVXSSOLHUV¶DELOLW\WROHDUQUHSOLFDWHDQG
LPLWDWHEX\LQJILUPV¶56&SUDFWLces which will lead them to improve their own RSC activities 
(Defee et al., 2009). It can be summarised that the central idea of transformational leadership 
is the ability of buying firms to inspire suppliers, so that they will transcend their normal 
SHUIRUPDQFH DQG DW WKH VDPH WLPH GHYHORS VXSSOLHUV¶ VHOI-interest to excel and commit to 
EX\LQJILUPV¶SODQBased on these arguments, the first hypothesis is proposed as:  
  H1:  Transformational leadership is positively related to RSCP. 
2.2.2 Transactional Leadership in Supply Chain Context 
Transactional leadership is characterised by two dimensions, namely contingent reward and 
management-by-exception (Table 3).  TUDQVDFWLRQDO OHDGHUV FODULI\ IROORZHUV¶ UROHV DQG
requirements, then providing rewards for those who meet the expectations (Bass, 1990; Judge 
and Piccolo, 2004; Whittington et al., 2009).  Drawing upon this tenet, transactional leadership 
in the SCM context is conceptualised as the behaviour of buying firms in: clarifying VXSSOLHUV¶
expectations and roles; rewarding, monitoring and auditing suppliers (Birasnav et al., 2015; 
Agi and Nishant, 2017; Blome et al., 2017; Gosling et al., 2017).  Gosling et al. (2017) deduced 
that buying firms who are committed towards contract compliance (such as defect inspection 
and quality monitoring) are practising transactional leadership.  Moreover, by exhibiting a 
transactional leadership style, a buying firm can initiate rewarding behaviours that trigger 
information sharing between both parties (Birasnav et al. 2015). While through a 
transformational leadership, a buying firm inspires the supplier to do more than contracted, 
transactional leaders strive to ensure that suppliers do exactly as expected (Hartog et al., 1997; 
Bass et al., 2003; Birasnav et al., 2015).  
Table 3:  The Dimensions of Transactional SCL 
Dimension Description Sources 
Contingent 
Reward 
The contingent reward has been identified as a reasonably effective 
construct in motivating followers to achieve higher levels of 
performance and development that can contribute to organisational 
growth and competencies.  By using this method, a buying firm will 
assign suppliers, and agree on goals and objectives with potential 
rewards or actual rewards in exchange for attaining the assigned levels. 
Hult et al., 
(2000a); Hult et 
al., (2007); 
Birasnav et al., 
(2015). 
7 
 
Management-
by-Exception 
Through management-by-exception practices, a buying firm tends to 
PRQLWRUGHYLDQFHVLQPHPEHUV¶DVVLJQPHQWDQGWDNHFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQLI
necessary.   
Suppliers¶DGRSWLRQRI RSC practices can also be maximised by using transactional SCL.  Using 
a transactional approach, a buying firm will monitor and keep track of the performance of the 
suppliers by comparing it to a certain set of pre-determined rules or agreements (Birasnav et 
al., 2015).  At the same time, in order to promote compliance, rewards can be offered to supply 
chain members; a buying firm is also able to use punishment schemes (Blome et al., 2017).  By 
enforcing close tracking of RSC practices, immediate feedback on improvement and potential 
corrective actions can be shared with the suppliers (Liao et al., 2012).  Suppliers tend to adhere 
to rules and regulations so that they are able to reduce the risk of potential losses or 
complications such as business termination (Blome et al., 2017).  Obviously, the main reason 
for monitoring, rewarding and punishing suppliers is to ensure their products or parts are 
aligned to quality requirements from the buying firm (Maestrini et al., 2018); this approach 
indirectly influences and improves VXSSOLHUV¶56&3%eing inactive in monitoring suppliers¶
adoption of RSC practices often means that there is less communication, feedback and 
monitoring of the suppliers, pointing towards a lack of collaborative activities between buying 
firms and suppliers in the realisation of environmental sustainability in supply chains (Agi and 
Nishant, 2017; Blome et al., 2017; Gosling et al., 2017).  Hence, the second hypothesis can be 
formulated as:   
H2:  Transactional leadership is positively related to RSCP.   
2.3 The Role of Governance Mechanisms in Supply Chain Context 
In the SCM context, governance can be interpreted as the set of interaction principles between 
buying firms and their suppliers.  These interaction principles specify the manners and tasks 
that should be performed by the buying firms and suppliers in order to achieve mutually agreed 
goals and objectives (Um and Kim, 2018; Fawcett et al., 2017).  Governance can be defined 
as:   
«³a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the initiation, termination and on-
going relationship maintenance between a set of parties´(Heide 1994, pp. 72).     
Heide (1994) further described that any type of governance should place emphasis on 
organising, monitoring and enforcing exchange rules between parties.  Similarly, Jap and 
Ganesan (2000, pp. 230) defined governance mechanisms as: 
³Safeguards which firms put in place to govern inter-organisational exchange, 
minimise exposure to opportunism and protect transaction specific investments.´ 
Predominantly, such mechanisms were designed to reduce opportunistic behaviours of 
exchange parties mainly through contractual governance and legal-legitimate power 
(Lumineau and Henderson, 2012).  However, the advancement of governance theory suggested 
that the role of governance mechanisms is also crucial in mitigating conflict and promoting 
cooperation between supply chain members (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Shahzad et al., 2018), 
fostering information and knowledge sharing, improving supply chain agility, flexibility, 
financial and non-financial performance, as well as cultivating environmental sustainability ( 
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Williamson, 1985; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Blome et al., 2013; 
Wacker et al., 2016; Um and Kim, 2018).   
While contractual governance is referring to the definition of responsibilities of supply chain 
members through formal agreements or contracts, relational governance is focusing on the 
regulation of relationships among supply chain members through informal rules such as trust, 
flexibility, solidarity and fairness (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Abdi and Aulakh, 2012).   
2.3.1 6XSSOLHUV¶7UXVWDQG5Hlational Governance 
Several informal instruments have been considered and examined in relation to relational 
governance such as trust (Nooteboom et al., 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Yu et al., 2006; 
Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008; Liu et al., 2017; Shahzad et al., 2018), communication and 
information exchange (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Cao and Zhang, 2011; Bstieler and Hemmert, 
2015), as well as collaboration (Cai et al., 2009; Hernández-Espallardo et al., 2013; Dong et 
al., 2017) between buying firms and suppliers.  However, trust is regarded as the most 
prominent relational governance mechanisms compared to the others as it is deemed to have a 
significant role in improving supply chain performance (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ghosh and 
Fedorowicz, 2008; Burkert et al., 2012; Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Liu et al., 2017).  Trust has 
been extensively considered as a central factor in facilitating inter-firm relationships, 
particularly between buying firms and suppliers (Zaheer et al., 1998; Sako and Helper, 1998;  
Ireland and Webb, 2007; Seppänen et al., 2007; Panayides and Lun, 2009; Capaldo and 
Giannoccaro, 2015; Shahzad et al., 2018).  Alongside contracts, trust has been considered as 
one of the best mechanisms for organisational control (Dyer and Chu, 2000).  Trust in the SCM 
context can be defined as: 
«³RQH¶VEHOLHIWKDWRQH¶V supply chain partner will act in a consistent manner and do 
what he / she says he / she will do´(Spekman et al. 1998, pp. 56) 
6XSSOLHUV¶WUXVWtowards buying firms leads to numerous benefits in supply chain activities such 
DV HQFRXUDJLQJ VXSSOLHUV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQYHVWPHQW FROODERUDWLRQ LQIRUPation sharing, 
sustainability practiceVDQGLPSURYLQJVXSSOLHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH(Kim et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 
2018; Ramon-Jeronimo et al., 2017; Zaefarian et al., 2016; Li et al., 2015; Nyaga et al., 2010; 
Laaksonen et al., 2008). Investment iQ IRVWHULQJ VXSSOLHUV¶ WUXVt often results in economic 
benefits and reducing transaction costs (Dyer and Chu, 2003).  Nonetheless, VXSSOLHUV¶ 
opportunistic behaviours can be minimised as trust leads to the reduction of perceived risks 
and uncertainty in supply relationships (Yawar and Seuring, 2015; Chen et al., 2011).  
6XSSOLHUV¶ WUXVW WRZDUGV EX\LQJ ILUPV LV H[WUHPHO\ SUHYDOHQW when the buying firPV¶
dependency on suppliers is high.  If the dependency on suppliers is high but buying firms failed 
WR IRVWHU VXSSOLHUV¶ WUXVW RQ WKHP WKHUH LV a high possibility that suppliers can develop 
opportunistic behaviours (Laaksonen et al., 2008; Zhang and Huo, 2013; Zhao et al., 2018).  
7KHDELOLW\RIDEX\LQJILUPWRIRVWHUVXSSOLHUV¶WUXVWRQWKHPZLOOHQKDQFHVXSSOLHUV¶LQLWLDWLYHV
towards RSC practices as they will feel confident and secure to work together with the buying 
firms in achieving such missions.  At the same time, suppliers are willing to share information 
and knowledge, collaborate, and even involve themselves in designing RSC practices and 
activities that can be used throughout supply networks (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Zhang et al., 
2012).      
However, buying firms should realise that they are responsible for IRVWHULQJVXSSOLHUV¶WUXVW
Through a transformational leadership style, a buying firm tends to work collaboratively with 
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suppliers, providing any necessary assistance, support and motivation. In these situations, 
suppliers will assume that the buying firm is concerned about their success (Birasnav et al., 
2015).  Nevertheless, the nature of transformational SCL drives buying firms to mentor and 
coach suppliers, and to encourage them to express their ideas and improving their strengths 
(Roman, 2017; Teoman and Ulengin, 2018).  By being actively involved in the discussion with 
suppliers, providing feedback and suggestions, as well as providing rewards when necessary, 
the value of buyer-supplier relationships can be optimised (Delbufalo, 2012).  At the same 
time, as a great amount of information will be shared across the supply network, assistance and 
support (including training) will be provided to the suppliers by the buying firms, suppliers 
will be confident in the relationship (Sako and Helper, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2000; Hemmert et 
al., 2016).  This leads to a higher extent of trust between suppliers and the buying firms.   
Nonetheless, transactional SCL (which includes FODULI\LQJDQGVSHFLI\LQJVXSSOLHUV¶UROHs and 
EX\LQJ ILUPV¶ H[SHFWDWLRQV) can help suppliers to understand buying firms in a better way 
(Birasnav et al., 2015).  The practice of monitoring and auditing suppliers leads the buying firm 
to have close communication and can foster collaboration. By having close communication and 
contact, uncertainty about buying firm behaviours can be reduced; this increases the VXSSOLHUV¶
trust (Ramon-Jeronimo et al., 2017).  Furthermore, the existence of clear and fair reward 
mechanisms has a positive effect on the trust towards buying firm (Zaefarian et al., 2016; 
Hemmert et al., 2016; Yawar and Seuring, 2018).  Given the potential direct relationships 
between SCL and trust, and trust and RSCP, the third and fourth hypotheses are proposed as: 
H3:  Trust positively mediates the relationship between transformational leadership and 
RSCP. 
H4: Trust positively mediates the relationship between transactional leadership and 
RSCP. 
2.3.2  Legal-Legitimate Power and Contractual Governance 
In supply chain relationships, the interactions normally occur between two or more parties, 
which have different interests and objectives.  Opportunism, disagreement and conflict might 
arise as each party strives towards their own benefits and goals, thus signalling the need for 
contractual governance (Bai et al., 2016).  Contractual governance has been identified as a 
pivotal tool for facilitating and monitoring supply chain relationships and performance (Yang 
and Lien, 2018).  Contractual governance relies on the use of formal contracts, legal contracts, 
explicit contracts or legal safeguards to manage the relationship between buying firms and 
suppliers (Williamson, 2008; Liu et al., 2009; Carey and Lawson, 2011; Cao and Lumineau, 
2015; Wang et al., 2016).  A formal contract or legal agreement which is considered as  an 
instrument of control, LV WKH RIILFLDO ZULWWHQ GRFXPHQW VSHFLI\LQJ VXSSO\ FKDLQ SDUWQHUV¶
obligations and expectations (Williamson, 1985, 1991; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012).   
One of the main purposes of having contracts is to exert control or influence over the supply 
chain members with the assistance, enforcement or involvement of another party including the 
legal system (Lumineau and Henderson, 2012).  This indicates the readiness of the buying firm 
to exert legal-legitimate power (hereafter power) towards their suppliers (Maloni and Benton, 
2000; Nyaga et al., 2010).  Usually, ex ante details are outlined in the contracts to facilitate the 
monitoring process of supply chain members (Carey and Lawson, 2011).  Moreover, the 
contract is designed to plan for unforeseen circumstances, and to ensure agreement on issues 
such as quality, price, quantity and specifications of the products (Carey and Lawson, 2011).  
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A contract might consist of a number of clauses, requirements, obligations and non-compliance 
settlements (such as penalties) (Williamson, 1985; Yu et al., 2006; Carey and Lawson, 2011).  
Using contract and power, EX\LQJ ILUPV DUH DEOH WR SURPRWH VXSSOLHUV¶ DGKHUHQFH  RSC 
practices can be stipulated in the contracts, allowing WKHEX\LQJILUPVWRUHGXFHVXSSOLHUV¶non-
conformance behaviours; furthermore, by exerting power using a contract, the buying firms 
will be able to improve supplier performance as suppliers will try to avoid any conflict with 
the buying firms that might lead to legal disputes (Sancha et al., 2016; Wacker et al., 2016).  
Nonetheless, suppliers will try to avoid breaching the contracts as it can lead to financial (such 
as order or payment delay) and non-financial (such as loss of future business) losses (Um and 
Kim, 2018; Yang and Lien, 2018). 
The central idea of transformational leadership is the ability of the leader to inspire followers, 
so that they will transcend the expectations or normal performance, and at the same time 
GHYHORSIROORZHUV¶VHOI-LQWHUHVWWRH[FHODQGFRPPLWZLWKOHDGHUV¶Slan  (Hartog et al., 1997;  
Bass et al., 2003).  On the other hand, the nature of transactional leaders is to identify 
performance requirements and ensure that the followers adhere to expectations (Hartog et al., 
1997; Bass and Bass, 2008; Whittington et al., 2009). The main motive of leading the followers 
RU VXSSOLHUV LV WR HQVXUH WKDW WKH EX\LQJ ILUPV¶ SODQ LV H[HFXWHG DV LQWHnded.  Thus, both 
leadership styles will significantly contribute to a greater exercise of power, which will also 
lead to better performance of the suppliers in adopting RSC practices.  Again, given the 
potential direct relationships between SCL and power, and power and RSCP, the fifth and sixth 
hypotheses are proposed as: 
H5:  Power positively mediates the relationship between transformational leadership 
and RSCP. 
H6: Power positively mediates the relationship between transactional leadership and 
RSCP. 
2.4 Proposed Research Framework 
The proposed research framework and hypotheses are shown in Figure 1, indicating five 
constructs and the relationships among each other.   
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Figure 1:  Research Framework and Hypotheses 
3. Research Methodology 
A seven-point Likert scale surYH\ZDVGHVLJQHGWRFDSWXUHVXSSOLHUV¶SHUFHLYHGOHYHORIEX\LQJ
ILUPV¶OHDGHUVKLSVW\OHVVXSSOLHUV¶WUXVWRQEX\LQJILUPVSRZHUH[KLELWHGE\EX\LQJILUPVDQG
FXUUHQWVXSSOLHUV¶RSCP.  Prior to data collection, two phases of content validity were executed.  
Pre-testing sessions with three experienced researchers were conducted to get feedback on the 
validity of the constructs.  The questionnaire items were modified and emailed to 17 experts: 
statisticians (3), academics with expertise in supply chain management practices (6) and 
industry experts (8) for their feedback on the questionnaire structure and its readability, 
resulting in more complete and clear instruments in the final version of the survey 
questionnaire.   
3.1 Measures and Control Variables 
The measures for transformational and transactional leadership were adapted from Defee et al. 
(2010), Hult et al. (2000a; 2007) and Avolio et al. (1999).  The items in the questionnaire were 
designed to capture the leadership styles exhibited by the buying firms towards their suppliers.  
Measures for trust were adapted from Doney and Cannon (1997), which were designed to 
FDSWXUH VXSSOLHUV¶ WUXVW WRZDUGV WKHLUbuying firm.  Measures for power were adapted from 
Maloni and Benton (2000).  The questions for power were aimed at capturing the exercise of 
legal-legitimate power by the buying firms towards their suppliers.  Finally, measures for 
VXSSOLHUV¶56&3ZHUHDGDSWHGIURPHazen et al. (2015) and; Olugu and Wong (2012) (see also 
the Table 2).  Two items were used as control variables, ZKLFKDUHILUPV¶VL]HDQGWKHLUSRVLWLRQ
in the supply chain (Tier-1, Tier-2 or Tier-3 suppliers).    
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3.2 Survey Design and Sample Characteristics 
The questionnaire was distributed using online platforms (Qualtrics and email) and during 
VXSSOLHUV¶EULHILQJHYents. Respondents for this study included top, middle and lower managers 
across various sectors including automotive, steel, oil and gas, fast moving consumer goods 
(FMCG), pharmaceutical, tobacco, rubber, chemicals, electronics and machinery.  The survey 
sample was identified using the Federation of Malaysia Manufacturers directory and the 
research team¶V own industrial contacts.  In total, 830 survey questionnaires were distributed 
and 225 participants responded.  The final responses were 190 as 35 responses were removed 
due to significant incomplete or missing data (giving a 23% response rate).  Table 4 shows the 
background characteristics of the sample.   
Table 4:  Sample Background Characteristics 
 Frequency Percent 
)LUP¶V6L]H   
 Micro (less than 5 employees) 3 1.6 
 Small (6-75 employees) 51 26.8 
 Medium (76-200 employees) 68 35.8 
 Large (more than 200 employees) 68 35.8 
Industry   
 Automotive 42 22.1 
 Electrical and Electronics 32 16.8 
 Metal and Machinery 29 15.3 
 Rubber and Plastics 26 13.7 
 Chemicals 16 8.4 
 Others (Multiple Industries / Sectors) 12 6.3 
 Oil and Gas 8 4.2 
 Textile 5 2.6 
 Packaging and Printing 5 2.6 
 Food and Beverages 4 2.1 
 Agriculture 3 1.6 
 Steel 3 1.6 
 Furniture 2 1.1 
 Pharmaceutical 1 0.5 
 Tobacco 1 0.5 
 Toys 1 0.5 
5HVSRQGHQW¶V3RVLWLRQ   
Middle Management (Senior General Manager, General Manager,  
Senior Manager, Manager of Operations, Production, R&D, Sales or 
Marketing) 
101 53.2 
Senior Management (President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief 
Operating Officer, Managing Director, Director) 
68 35.8 
Lower Management (Engineer, Supervisor, Team Leader) 21 11.1 
5HVSRQGHQW¶V([SHULHQFHLQWKH)LUP   
More than 10 years 82 43.2 
2-5 years 60 31.6 
6-10 years 39 20.5 
Less than 1 year 9 4.7 
)LUP¶V3RVLWLRQLQWKH6XSSO\&KDLQ   
Tier 1 (Direct Suppliers to the buying firm / Components Suppliers e.g.: 
Denso, Continental, Sensata Technologies) 
120 63.2 
Tier 2 (Sub-Components Suppliers to Tier 1 suppliers that then supplies 
them to buying firm) 
45 23.7 
Tier 3 (Raw materials suppliers e.g.: Steel, Plastic, Glass, Rubber) 25 13.2 
Interaction with Focal Firm   
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Yes (Interact with focal firm) 181 95.3 
No  (No interaction with focal firm) 9 4.7 
3.3 Data Screening 
The screening processes employed included: missing data checking, outlier detection, 
normality testing and multicollinearity testing.  Mean substitution was used as the approach to 
deal with missing data as it allows to keep as many responses as possible.  Two main steps in 
detecting outliers were used: (i) boxplot examination; (ii) comparison of the mean value of the 
item with its 5% trimmed mean (Pallant, 2016).  The dataset used for this research did not 
suffer from extreme outliers and so no response was removed, transformed or modified.  
Furthermore, the dataset did not contain extreme skewness and kurtosis based on the approach 
recommended by Hair et al. (2014b), with both values within the range of -1 to +1.  The 
multicollinearity test revealed that there was no multicollinearity between the independent 
variables as the tolerance value was more than .10 and the variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
less than 10.   
3.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The principal axis factoring extraction method with Promax Rotation was used to identify the 
latent variables and their respective items. Sampling adequacy was measured using the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) DQG%DUWOHWW¶V tests, revealing that factor analysis was useful for the data 
in this study (KMO for all constructs were higher than 0.8; the significance value was less than 
0.001).  After removing all cross-loaded (items loaded into more than one factor) and low-
communality (below 0.5) items, the result was a total of 48 items loaded onto five latent factors.  
The top three items (in terms of factor loading) were utilised in order to represent each factor.  
The practice of using items with the highest loadings (or surrogate items) is common as those 
items have a greater influence on their respective factor (Dubey et al., 2015; Hair et al., 2014a).  
Hence, 15 items were retained for subsequent examination using confirmatory factor analysis.  
Retained items and their factor loadings are shown in Table 5 (full results of the EFA and item 
total statistics are shown in the Supplementary Materials section ± see Tables S1 and S2 
respectively).     
         Table 5:  Exploratory Factor Analysis Result 
  TFL 
(1) 
TSL 
(2) 
TR 
(3) 
POW 
(4) 
RSCP 
(5) 
Buying firm talks enthusiastically about what 
needs to be accomplished in the supply chain 
0.936 
    
Buying firm clarifies the central purpose 
underlying their supply chain actions 
0.910 
    
Buying firm spends time teaching and coaching 
us 
0.907 
    
Buying firm tracks our company mistakes 
 
0.963 
   
Buying firm concentrates their full attention on 
dealing with our mistakes 
 
0.922 
   
Buying firm concentrates on our failures 
 
0.993 
   
When making important decisions, the buying 
firm considers our welfare as well as its own 
  
0.898 
  
Buying firm keeps our best interests in mind 
  
0.937 
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Buying firm is honest with our company 
  
0.947 
  
Buying firm often refers to a portion of an 
agreement to gain our compliance on a 
particular request 
   
0.887 
 
Buying firm makes a point to refer to any legal 
agreement when attempting to influence us 
   
0.895 
 
Buying firm uses sections of our sales 
agreement as a "tool" to get us to agree to their 
demands 
   
0.915 
 
Cost of retrieving returned products 
    
0.860 
Cost of storing returned products 
    
0.866 
Cost of remanufacturing, replenishment and 
reproduction of returned products 
    
0.874 
TFL ± Transformational Leadership; TSL ± Transactional Leadership; TR ± Trust; POW ± Power; 
RSCP ± Reverse Supply Chain Performance 
3.5 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
AMOS v23 was used to analyse the proposed structural and measurement model. By using the 
five-factor model (transformational leadership, transactional leadership, trust, power and 
reverse performance) identified during the EFA, the initial measurement model was created.  
As shown in Table 6, the measurement model was statistically adequate.   
Table 6:  Model Fit Indices for Measurement Model 
Model Fit Index Value 
Chi-VTXDUHȤ 118.924 
Degrees of freedom (df) 80.000 
Chi-square goodness-of-ILWȤGI 1.487 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) 0.923 
Normed fit index (NFI) 0.950 
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.983 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.977 
%ROOHQ¶VLQFUHPHQWDOILWLQGH[,), 0.983 
Standardised root mean squared residual (SRMR) 0.042 
Root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.056 
pClose 0.456 
3.5.1 Model Reliability and Validity 
Average variance extracted (AVE) was used to estimate convergent and discriminant validity.  
Table 7 shows that the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) was higher than the 
cut-off value of 0.50 recommended by Hair et al., (2014b) for all factors.  It can be specified 
that the items in the latent factors were measuring at least 79.6% of their own factor rather than 
any other (the lowest AVE value was 0.796 for transformational leadership).   
As illustrated in Table 8, the lowest &URQEDFK¶V alpha (Į was 0.810 (transformational 
leadership), higher than the recommended cut-off value (0.7) (Pallant, 2016).  This indicates 
that all items within the same factor were measuring the same attribute.  Similarly, the lowest 
composite reliability (CR) value was 0.836 (again, transformational leadership), higher than 
the cut-off value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2011).  
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The tests confirmed that the factors used in the model were not having any reliability as well 
as convergent and discriminant validity issues. 
Table 7:  Square Root for AVE and Bivariate Correlations 
  Transformational Transactional Trust Power RSCP 
Transformational 0.796         
Transactional 0.231 0.911       
Trust 0.619 0.211 0.918     
Power 0.179 0.500 0.284 0.889   
RSCP 0.406 0.358 0.397 0.397 0.881 
*square root of AVE in italics 
Table 8:  Model Reliability 
 
Į CR AVE 
Transformational 0.810  0.836 0.633 
Transactional 0.935  0.936 0.830 
Trust 0.939  0.941 0.842 
Power 0.916  0.918 0.790 
RSCP 0.912  0.912 0.776 
 
3.5.2 Common Method Bias and Measurement Model Invariance Test 
As a single method (questionnaire survey) was used to gather data on the independent 
(predictor) and dependent (criterion) variables, there was a possibility for common method 
variance and bias.  By using an approach proposed by Podsakoff et al. (2003), a common 
method bias test using a common latent factor (CLF) was carried out.  The test revealed that 
there was no significant difference on the standardised regression weight before and after the 
common latent factor was added.  Thus, it can be concluded that no common method bias was 
reported for this study.  The invariance test for the measurement model was conducted in order 
to identify the consistency of the factor structure on different groups.  Two groups were tested 
which are: (i) Tier 1 Firms vs Tier 2 and Tier 3 Firms; (ii) Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) vs Large Corporations.  The test showed an insignificant difference for the chi-squared 
statistic between the unconstrained and fully constrained models across the four multi-groups, 
indicating that the factor structure was consistent across all groups in the dataset.  These 
findings confirmed that the dataset met the condition for configural invariance (same structure 
across groups) (Dimitrov, 2010; Milfont and Fischer, 2010). 
4. Findings 
As shown in Table 9, the overall fit of the hypothesised structural model was adequate.  All 
hypotheses were tested while controlling for the ILUP¶VVL]HDQGWKHLUVXSSO\FKDLQSRVLWLRQ
The direct and mediation tests were conducted independently on the full model to ensure 
greater clarity and parsimony.   
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Table 9:  Model Fit Indices for Structural Model 
Model Fit Index Value 
Chi-VTXDUHȤ 166.782 
Degrees of freedom (df) 110.000 
Chi-square goodness-of-ILWȤGI 1.516 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) 0.908 
Normed fit index (NFI) 0.931 
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.975 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.969 
%ROOHQ¶VLQFUHPHQWDOILWLQGH[,), 0.975 
Standardised root mean squared residual (SRMR) 0.072 
Root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.052 
pClose 0.394 
4.1 Direct Relationship Between Supply Chain Leadership and Reverse Supply Chain 
Performance 
This study reveals that transformational and transactional-based SCL contributed to VXSSOLHUV¶
RSCP.  Figure 2 shows the beta values (ȕ and significance level of the relationship between 
SCL and RSCP. Findings revealed that the relationship between transformational leadership 
was SRVLWLYHO\VLJQLILFDQW WRZDUGV56&3ȕ 6, p <.001).  The findings discovered that 
transactional leadership was also positively significant towards RSCP ȕ = .275, p <.001).     
 
Figure 2:  Structural Model and Findings 
4.2 The Mediating Effects of Trust and Power 
The second objective of this study is to understand the underlying reasons for explaining the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ6&/DQGVXSSOLHU¶V RSCP by testing the mediating role of two governance 
mechanisms, trust and power.  The data were bootstrapped to 5,000 samples and the 95% of 
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confidence interval was used to determine the significance of the indirect effects at the lower 
2.5th and upper 97.5th percentiles.  The findings discovered that trust and power were both 
significant as mediators towards RSCP.  As shown in Table 10, trust partially mediated the 
relationship between transformational leadership and RSCP, while power fully mediated the 
relationship between transactional leadership and RSCP.   
 
Table 10:  The Relationship between Trust, Power and Supply Chain Performance 
Relationship 
Direct 
Effect 
Without 
Mediator 
Direct 
Effect 
With 
Mediator 
Indirect 
Effect 
(95% 
Bias-
corrected 
CI) 
Bootstrap CI 
Remarks 
Lower Upper 
TransformationalÆTrustÆRSCP .336*** .198* .059* 0.031 0.260 Partial 
TransactionalÆTrustÆRSCP .275*** .262*** .017 NS -0.100 0.610 No 
TransformationalÆPowerÆRSCP .336*** .322*** .017 NS -0.024 0.093 No 
TransactionalÆPowerÆRSCP .275*** .155NS .125* 0.030 0.249 Full 
Notes: *p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, NS ± Not significant 
 
5. Discussion 
Table 11 shows the summary of the hypotheses testing.  The findings suggest that by exhibiting 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOOHDGHUVKLSDEX\LQJILUPLVDEOHWRFXOWLYDWHVXSSOLHUV¶LQLWLDWLYHVWRZDUGRSC 
orientation.  Moreover, a transformational-based buying firm is usually characterised by the 
willingness to provide encouragement and training to supply chain partners.  This nature of 
transformational leadership will help suppliers to cooperate in achieving mutual sustainability 
goals (Vivaldini and Pires, 2016; Roman, 2017;).  Nevertheless, as the buying firms are willing 
to share resources and teach the suppliers, sustainability initiatives are most likely to be attained 
by having knowledge transfer and learning (/¶+HUPLWWHHWDOGosling et al., 2017;).  
Table 11:  Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses Result 
H1: Transformational leadership is positively related to RSCP. Accepted 
H2: Transactional leadership is positively related to RSCP. Accepted 
H3: Trust mediates the relationship between transformational leadership and RSCP. Accepted 
H4: Trust mediates the relationship between transactional leadership and RSCP. Rejected 
H5: Power mediates the relationship between transformational leadership and RSCP. Rejected 
H6:  Power mediates the relationship between transactional leadership and RSCP. Accepted 
Even though most literature in this domain argued that transformational leadership is the sole 
contributor towards supply chain performance, this study found that the role of transactional 
leadership should not be ignored by scholars and practitioners. This affirms that transactional 
leadership, which is leaning towards controlling and monitoring the suppliers, can play a role 
towards the improvement of RSCP.  A buying firm that is exhibiting transactional SCL is most 
OLNHO\WRKDYHDFORVHPRQLWRULQJV\VWHPRQWKHLUVXSSOLHUV7KLVLVLQLWLDOO\WRHQVXUHVXSSOLHUV¶
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compliance and adherence so that the performance of the buying firm is not compromised.  
+RZHYHUWKLVDSSURDFKLQGLUHFWO\LQIOXHQFHVVXSSOLHUV¶56&3 
As the recent practice in the industry forces the buying firms to shift their attention towards 
sustainability, they also have to ensure that their supply chain partners, especially upstream 
suppliers, are able to provide and collaborate with them (Silvestre, 2015; Agi and Nishant, 
2017).  The buying firms now need more cooperation from their suppliers in order to recycle 
and replenish their products to achieve the sustainability goals,QRUGHUWRHQVXUHVXSSOLHUV¶
commitment, frequent monitoring and audit sessions are held; such activities might also go 
beyond first-tier suppliers (Gong et al., 2018).  This can be supported by the descriptive finding 
indicating that 95.3% of the firms in the sample have a direct contact with their buying firms 
regardless of their position in the supply chain.    
The second main finding of this study reveals the role of trust and power as the variables that 
account or are responsible for the relationship between SCL and RSCP. Partial mediation 
indicates that only a certain portion of the relationship is explained by the mediator, whereas 
full mediation indicates that the association between SCL an RSCP is fully explained by the 
mediator.  It was also found that the relationship between transformational leadership and 
RSCP was partially mediated by trust.  By exhibiting transformational leadership, buying firms 
DUHDEOHWRHQKDQFHVXSSOLHUV¶WUXVWRQWKHLUILUPZKLFKin the end influences RSCP.  Thanks 
to the inspirational, motivational and intellectually stimulating role played by the buying firm, 
suppliers tend to believe that buying firms are transparent and honest with them (Venselaar et 
al., 2015; Birasnav et al., 2015). Due to that, they are willing to innovate and invest more to 
improve their operations (also with reference to RSC elements).   
At the same time, it was found that the relationship between transactional leadership was fully 
mediated by power, as the nature of transactional leaders is to apply reward and punishment 
schemes, as well as highly monitoring and auditing approaches.  This will lead them to exercise 
KLJK SRZHU DV WKH LQVWUXPHQWV WR HQVXUH VXSSOLHUV¶ REOLJDWLRQ DQG REHGLHQFH WRZDUGV WKeir 
requirements (Blome et al., 2017).  By exercising high power, suppliers will carefully monitor 
their own performance, so that they will not violate the contract that can cause them subsequent 
penalty including business termination.  Their adherence to the contracts and requirements by 
the buying firms lead them to improve their RSCP practices.       
6. Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
The findings of this study offer guidance to firms across supply chains on the role of buying 
ILUP¶VOHDGHUVKLSDSSURDFKes and its influence towards the operationalisation of RSC practices, 
which represent an implementation of CE strategies at an inter-organisational level.  Results of 
the study indicate the existence of a direct relationship between SCL and RSCP, with 
transformational and transactional leadership approaches leading to higher VXSSOLHUV¶RSCP. 
Moreover, this research found that trust and power were significant mediators between SCL 
DQGVXSSOLHUV¶RSCP.  The relationship between transformational leadership and RSCP was 
partially explained by trust, while the relationship between transactional leadership and 
VXSSOLHUV¶RSCP was fully explained by power.  It is apparent that transformational leadership 
improves VXSSOLHUV¶ WUXVW of the buying firm, while transactional leadership increased the 
perception of power exercised by the buying firms. Both leadership approaches led to a higher 
RSCP, even if through different mechanisms. This phenomenon can be explained further by 
saying that transformational leadership uses trust as the main instrument WRHQKDQFHVXSSOLHUV¶
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RSCP, whereas transactional leadership uses power as the main instrument to achieve the same 
goal.  
This research contributes to the emerging literature strand concerned with supply chain 
leadership (Defee et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2017), by expanding the classical intra-
organisational leadership to inter-organisational leadership from the perspective of the SCM 
environment.  Even though this is not the first study that expands classical leadership theory 
into the supply chain context, this research offers first attempt to examine the role of buying 
ILUPV¶ OHDGHUVKLS to improve RSCP. The result affirms that the role of the buying firms¶ 
leadership behaviours is significant towards RSCP, thus filling the gap of insufficient studies 
about SCL in RSCs.  Secondly, this study further validates SCL concepts by combining 
OHDGHUVKLSEHKDYLRXUVDQGJRYHUQDQFHPHFKDQLVPVWRLPSURYHVXSSOLHUV¶RSCP.  Finally, this 
research further contributes to operations and SCM literature by proposing that a combination 
of both transactional and transformational leadership approaches should be implemented in 
RUGHU WR LPSURYH VXSSOLHUV¶ performance, and at the same time to strive towards the 
implementation of RSC practices through the supply chains.   
This study also suffers with a few limitations.  Specifically, although the considered sample 
size is sufficient, a larger sample could improve the generalisability of findings.  Furthermore, 
the research focuses on a dyadic relationship between the buying firm and its immediate 
upstream suppliers, which limits the SCL concept to be explained as leadership of buying firms 
in contrast to the recent work of Jia et al. (2018).  While Jia et al. (2018) emphasised on the 
role of focal firms, particularly multi-national corporations (MNCs), in orchestrating 
sustainability activities of their multi-tier upstream suppliers, this study focuses on the role of 
the buying firms in improving their LPPHGLDWHVXSSOLHUV¶56&3IURPDG\DGLFSHUVSHFWLve.  
Nonetheless, Jia et al. (2018) conceptualised governance mechanism from a relational 
perspective; this study operationalises the same construct from an instrument perspective 
(dealing with VXSSOLHUV¶WUXVWDQGOHJDO-legitimate power).   
Furthermore, since a cross-sectional survey design was adopted, key informant and common 
method bias are expected. Purposive sampling was adopted in order to deal with the key 
informant bias; a common latent factor test was conducted for investigating the common 
method bias. Such issues could have been further reduced if a mixed-methods research design 
was adopted (Krause et al., 2018; Montabon et al., 2018).        
In order to address such limitations, future research can examine the SCL concept further 
beyond dyadic interactions, by looking at the ability of the buying firm to influence the 
sustainability practices of its supply chain members across multiple tiers (as suggested by Jia 
et al., 2018). Thus, future studies could adopt, at least, a triadic approach to examine the buying 
ILUP¶VOHDGHUVKLSDSSURDFKSHQHWUDWLRQEH\RQGWLHU-1 suppliers.   However, it should be noted 
that, very often, the responsibility to manage VXSSOLHUV¶sustainability practices relies on direct 
buying firms rather than on focal firms, as, in most of the cases, the focal firm does not have 
any contractual relationship with suppliers beyond the first tier (Wilhelm et al., 2016).   
In addition, more emphasis could be placed on the co-existence of different leadership styles, 
examining whether a buying firm can exhibit different kinds of leadership approaches towards 
different suppliers and the combined effect of transactional and transformational leadership 
styles. Furthermore, the role of SCL and governance mechanisms towards the social dimension 
of RSCP could be explored, given the recent focus on holistic views of the CE, which go 
beyond economic and environmental performance (Kirchherr et al., 2017).  
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As this research has relied on a quantitative method, the generalisation of the results can be 
attained; however, an in-depth explanation of the phenomenon is missing.  Indeed, as the 
relationship with each supplier is unique, different leadership approaches might be needed and 
the concept of relying only on one type of leadership (either just transformational or 
transactional) and generalizing it to all buyer-supplier relationships is extremely perilous. 
Qualitative methods (such as expert interviews) would contribute highly to the supply chain 
literature by having a comprehensive explanation of SCL role towards the realisation of RSCP.  
Furthermore, given the fact that SCL is a relational-based concept, it could be useful to examine 
the concept in different contexts including different industries (such as the service industry) 
and countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Measurement Items 
In this section, please indicate the extent of leadership approaches exhibited by your immediate buying firm.   
7R ZKDW H[WHQG ZRXOG \RX DJUHH RU GLVDJUHH ZLWK WKH IROORZLQJ VWDWHPHQWV LQ UHODWLRQ WR EX\LQJ ILUPV¶ OHDGHUVKLS
approaches? 1- Strongly Disagree, 7 ± Strongly Agree 
Buying firm goes beyond its self-interest for the good of the supply chain (TFL) 
*Buying firm talks enthusiastically about what needs to be accomplished in the supply chain (TFL) 
*Buying firm clarifies the central purpose underlying their supply chain actions (TFL) 
Buying firm displays power and confidence (TFL) 
Buying firm seeks different views when solving supply chain issues (TFL) 
Buying firm suggests new ways in solving supply chain issues (TFL) 
Our company is encouraged to express ideas (TFL) 
*Buying firm spends time teaching and coaching us (TFL) 
Our company gets individual consideration (TFL) 
Buying firm encourages us to improve our strengths (TFL) 
Buying firm lets us know what is expected of us in the supply chain process (TSL) 
Buying firm encourages the use of uniform procedures in the supply chain process (TSL) 
Buying firm decides what shall be done and how it will be done in the supply chain process (TSL) 
Buying firm maintains definite standards of performance in the supply chain process (TSL) 
Buying firm asks that we follow established purchasing rules and procedures (TSL) 
Buying firm rewards our company for achievement (TSL) 
Our company is punished for fault and misconduct such as late delivery (TSL) 
*Buying firm tracks our company mistakes (TSL) 
*Buying firm concentrates their full attention on dealing with our mistakes (TSL) 
*Buying firm concentrates on our failures (TSL) 
 
In this section, please indicate the extent of trust between your firm and your immediate buying firm.   
To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to trust?  1 ± Strongly Disagree, 7 
± Strongly Agree 
Buying firm keeps their promises to our company (TR) 
We believe to the information provided by the buying firm (TR) 
Buying firm is concerned about our business success (TR) 
*When making important decisions, the buying firm considers our welfare as well as its own (TR) 
We find it is necessary to be cautious with the buying firm (TR) 
*Buying firm keeps our best interests in mind (TR) 
*Buying firm is honest with our company (TR) 
Buying firm is transparent with our company (TR) 
Buying firm will exploit our vulnerabilities (TR) 
Buying firm will not expose our production planning and drawings to other parties (TR) 
:HDUHZLOOLQJWRLQYHVWLQQHZLQIUDVWUXFWXUHRUIDFLOLWLHVWRIXOILOEX\LQJILUP¶VQHHGV(TR) 
Buying firm is trustworthy (TR) 
 
 
In this section, please indicate the extent of power (contractual / legal) exercised by your immediate buying firm.   
To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to power (contractual / legal) 
exercised by the buying firm?  1 ± Strongly Disagree, 7 ± Strongly Agree 
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*Buying firm often refers to a portion of an agreement to gain our compliance on a particular request (POW) 
*Buying firm makes a point to refer to any legal agreement when attempting to influence us (POW) 
*Buying firm uses sections of our sales agreement as a "tool" to get us to agree to their demands (POW) 
 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQSOHDVHUDWH\RXUILUP¶Vsupply chain performance by comparing it to industry benchmark.     
Please express your judgement to each statement by ticking the most appropriate option.  1 ± Extremely Poor, 7 ± 
Excellent 
Cost of processing recyclable products  
*Cost of retrieving returned products 
*Cost of storing returned products 
*Cost of remanufacturing, replenishment and reproduction of returned products  
Availability of recyclable / reusable materials in products  
Availability of material recovery plan and warranty returns  
Ability to remanufacture and refurbish returned products  
Lead-time for unsold products to be remanufactured / refurbished  
Lead-time for warranty returns products to be remanufactured/refurbished  
Lead-time product recycling and reuse  
Ability to incorporate traditional practices with reverse supply chain practices i.e.: dismantling parts and recycle  
Ability to provide new infrastructure for new products research and development  
Ability to produce products with high reusable and recyclable materials  
 
*items selected for confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
 
TFL ± Transformational Leadership; TSL ± Transactional Leadership; TR ± Trust; POW ± Power; RSCP ± 
Reverse Supply Chain Performance 
 
